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When the United States ratifies a treaty,' it accepts and is bound by the
treaty's requirements as a matter of international law.' Not all of these
international obligations, however, may be enforced directly. In the United
States, treaties are divided into "self-executing treaties" -which can be
immediately enforced in courts and may create private rights of action'- and
"non-self-executing treaties" -which may not be judicially enforceable or may
have no status as domestic law unless Congress passes implementing
legislation.s In light of this distinction, the political branches often ratify
treaties with language identifying them as self- or non-self-executing. When
the self-executing status of a treaty is unclear, courts examine its text, its
history, and subsequent state practice to determine the parties' intentions.'
In Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court appeared to endorse the
presumption that, unless their text indicates otherwise, treaties are not self-
1. For the purposes of this Note, a "treaty" refers to an international agreement established
through the traditional Article II process. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. It is beyond the scope
of this Note to address how other international agreements influence domestic courts.
2. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, done May 23, 1969, u11 U.N.T.S. 331,
8 I.L.M. 679; Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 58o, 598 (1884).
3. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598.
4. The question of whether a treaty is self-executing is distinct from the question of whether
the treaty creates a private right of action. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 5o6 n.3
(2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ ill cmt. h (1987). For a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between self-execution,
private rights, and private rights of action, see Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy & Sara
Aronchick Solow, International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J.
INT'L L. (forthcoming 2011).
S. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). Professor Carlos Vizquez has identified four
types of non-self-executing treaties. Carlos Manuel Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-
Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995) [hereinafter Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of
Self-Executing Treaties]. This Note's analysis may not apply to the subset of treaties that are
non-self-executing because "they call for judgments of a nonjudicial nature." See Carlos
Manuel Vizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial
Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REv. 599, 631 (20o8) [hereinafter Vizquez, Treaties as
Law of the Land].
6. See SEAN D. MuRPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 222-23 (206). Professor Curtis
Bradley notes that "[t]here is some debate over whether a U.S. court should look to the
intent of the parties in deciding whether a treaty is self-executing, or simply to the intent of
the United States." Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 522 n.249 (1997).
Although other courts have found additional factors relevant, see, e.g., Islamic Republic of
Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1985), Medellin rejects a multifactor analysis,




executing.' On a practical level, Medellin increases the likelihood that future
treaties will include text clarifying whether they are self-executing," but the
status of numerous treaties passed without such language remains unclear.9
The narrowest reading of Medellin in the context of treaty law is that, because
the treaties that were at issue were not self-executing, an adverse decision of
the International Court of Justice was unenforceable in domestic courts."o
However, application of the Court's reasoning will likely result in more treaties
being deemed non-self-executing," and some lower courts appear to read
Medellin as approving the presumption in favor of non-self-execution.
Even before Medellin, non-self-executing treaties were commonly dismissed
as ineffectual agreements,' and even the most informed and definitive
international law texts suggest that such treaties are domestically impotent in
the absence of implementing legislation.' 4 As non-self-executing treaties,
standing alone, are perceived as having little to no effect on domestic
7. 552 U.S. at 505 ("[W]hile treaties 'may comprise international commitments ... they are not
domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself
conveys an intention that it be "self-executing" and is ratified on these terms."' (quoting
Igartida-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3 d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc))); see, e.g.,
Vizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 5, at 6o8 ("Parts of the Court's analysis in
Medellin could be read to adopt a presumption that treaties are non-self-executing.").
8. See Bradley, supra note 6, at 139-40 (finding that the Senate is adjusting its practices to
clarify new treaties' self-execution status).
9. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 552-53 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
10. See Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J.
INT'L L. 540, 541 (2008) ("[Medellin] is best read as requiring self-execution to be resolved
on a treaty-by-treaty basis, without resort to any general presumption."); AM. BAR Ass'N &
AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L LAw, ABA/ASIL JOINT TASK FORCE IN TREATIES IN U.S. LAw (2009),
available at http://www.asil.org/files/TreatiesTaskForceReport.pdf (describing possible
interpretations of Medellin).
n1. See Meera Rajnikant Shah, Note, Unnecessary Complications for Basic Obligations: Medellin v.
Texas and Common Article 3, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 891-92 (2010); David H. Moore,
Law(makers) of the Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 32,
46 (2009), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/moore.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring
in the denial of rehearing en banc).
13. See, e.g., Medellin, 552 U.S. at 553 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (implying that the creation of non-
self-executing treaties is a "near useless act"); Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism:
Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U.
PA. L. REv. 245, 261 (2001) (describing how non-self-executing human rights treaties are
perceived as "ineffective, dead letters of the law").
14. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 6, at 222; W. MICHAEL REISMAN, MAHNOUSH H. ARSANJANI,
SIEGFRIED WIESSNER & GAYLE S. WESTERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 1311 (2004).
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jurisprudence, Medellin's seeming new presumption triggered a flurry of
commentary in the academic community." Internationalist scholars deplored
Medellin's apparent approval of a presumption against self-execution."
Meanwhile, given that nationalists had already made an argument for such a
presumption,17 it is unsurprising that they celebrated its endorsement by the
Supreme Court.
Both sides missed the essential point." Self-execution is important insofar
as it increases the likelihood that a treaty will create a private right of action,
but treaties are rarely cited in domestic decisions on that basis. 20 Instead,
treaties most often influence domestic jurisprudence indirectly, when used as
15. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Medellin v. Texas and Treaties'End, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 26, 2008,
12:15 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/20o8/o/26/medellin-v-texas-and-treaties-end; Margaret
E. McGuinness, Medellin v. Texas: Supreme Court Holds IC] Decisions Under the Consular
Convention Not Binding Federal Law, Rejects Presidential Enforcement of ICJ Judgments over
State Proceedings, ASIL INSIGHTS (Apr. 17, 2008), http://wwv.asil.org/insightso8o418.cfm;
Debate, Medellin v. Texas, Part I: Self-Execution, FEDERALIST Soc'Y (Mar. 28, 2008),
http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.17/default.asp (featuring Ted Cruz, David Sloss,
Nick Rosenkranz, and Edwin Williamson); Edward Swaine, Comment on Medellin, OPINIo
JuIs (Mar. 26, 20o8, so: 24 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2008/0/26/comment-on-medellin;
Ernie Young, Medellin v. Texas: Another Set ofEarly Thoughts, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 25, 2008,
4:36 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/20o8/o3/25/medellin-v-texas-another-set-of-early
-thoughts.
16. See, e.g., Vizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 5, at 6o8 ("If read to establish a
presumption of non-self-execution, Medellin would be a radical holding indeed, requiring
rejection of the holdings of many Supreme Court decisions."); Shah, supra note 11, at 923
(describing a default presumption of non-self-execution as a "worst case interpretation of
the Court's holding in Medellin").
17. See John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-
Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2255 (1999). For responses to Yoo's arguments, see
Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties
as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); and Carlos Manuel Vizquez,
Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999).
18. See, e.g., Benjamin Beiter, Note, Beyond Medellin: Reconsidering Federalism Limits on the
Treaty Power, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1163, 1187 (2010) ("By adopting a presumption
against self-executing treaties, Medellin amounts to a preservation of state law absent a clear
congressional statement to the contrary.").
ig. Professor Curtis A. Bradley is unusual in his acknowledgment that "the [Medellin] decision
need not be read as entailing a significant reduction in the extent to which treaties will be
enforced by U.S. courts," Bradley, supra note lo, at 551, and that a self-executing
determination will not affect the interpretive role of a treaty, id. at 549 n.62.
20. See Bradley, supra note 6, at 482-83; cf MURPHY, supra note 6, at 223 (noting the




interpretive tools in conjunction with the Charming Betsy canon." The
Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation is a rebuttable presumption
that, when interpreting an ambiguous domestic statute, a judge should select a
reading that accords with U.S. international obligations." Because most judges
employing the Charming Betsy canon use it -and should continue to use it -
without regard to whether the relevant treaty is self-executing, Medellin's
seemingly monumental presumption is relatively insignificant.
Non-self-executing treaties may describe two types of U.S. international
obligations: they will always define treaty commitments, and they may
sometimes codify customary international law.' Scholars correctly assume that
non-self-executing treaties describing customary international law may be used
with the Charming Betsy canon in statutory construction." This Note expands
21. See Bradley, supra note 6, at 483 ("[C]ourts regularly rely on the Charming Betsy canon in
interpreting domestic law.").
22. In this Note, the term "statute" is used primarily to describe nonincorporative statutes.
Incorporative statutes -statutes enacted specifically to incorporate the terms of a treaty or
customary international law-occupy a unique position and should be interpreted in
accordance with the instrument they were meant to implement. For a closer examination of
how the Charming Betsy canon should be applied to incorporative and nonincorporative
statutes, see John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, So VA. J.
INT'L L. 655 (2010).
23. See, e.g., Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1226 (D. Minn. 2008)
(holding, post-Medellin, that the World Intellectual Property Organization treaties are non-
self-executing and that they are therefore "relevant insofar as [the statute at issue] is
ambiguous and there is a reasonable interpretation of [the statute] that aligns with the
United States' treaty obligations").
24. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1181 & n.332 (1990) (observing that courts may use
unratified and non-self-executing treaties as evidence of customary international law). In
keeping with the Supreme Court's terminology, this Note uses the terms "customary
international law" and "law of nations" interchangeably. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); Steven G. Calabresi &
Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred
Years ofPractice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 764 n-75
(2005) ("[R] eferences to [the Charming Betsy] canon of statutory construction often equate
Marshall's reference to the law of nations with international law.").
25. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Sheyn, An Accidental Violation: How Required Gardasil Vaccinations for
Female Immigrants to the United States Contravene International Law, 88 NEB. L. REV. 54, 554-
55 & n.139 (2010); Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention ofAliens: Lessons from
the Lives ofEllen Knauffand Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 1oo8 n.373 (1995); Lisa Cox,
Comment, The Legal Limbo ofIndefinite Detention: How Low Can You Go?, 5o AM. U. L. REV.
725, 752-53 (2001); M. Gavan Montague, Note, Should Aliens Be Indefinitely Detained Under
8 U.S.C. 5 1231? Suspect Doctrines and Legal Fictions Come Under Renewed Scrutiny,
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1439,1461-65 (2001).
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upon this assumption, demonstrating that ambiguous statutes may be
construed in light of all non-self-executing treaties. While there is a growing
consensus that courts may interpret ambiguous statutes in light of non-self-
executing treaties, scholarly pieces aclaowledging this possibility either offer
insufficient support for this claim or are too narrowly focused to provide a
comprehensive argument in favor of this practice. Despite relatively weak
academic support, however, scholars are increasingly relying on this interaction
as a foundational assumption for more complex arguments." By describing the
various ways in which courts have given indirect force to non-self-executing
treaties and by reviewing the normative justifications for this practice, this
Note provides needed support for future scholarship.
After reviewing the creation, animating principles, and application of the
Charming Betsy canon, Part I describes how non-self-executing treaties
currently influence statutory interpretation. When evaluating questions of U.S.
international obligations, domestic courts may turn to non-self-executing (or
even nonratified) treaties for guidance on the status and text of customary
international law. Courts then use these treaties, in conjunction with the
26. Professor Carlos Vazquez is often cited for the proposition that non-self-executing treaties
may play an interpretive role in construing domestic statutes. Vizquez writes, "In countless
cases, the vast majority of those raising treaty-based claims, the Court has resolved the case
without even mentioning the self-execution issue." Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-
Executing Treaties, supra note 5, at 716. While this statement bears on the argument that
non-self-executing treaties may be used in conjunction with the Charming Betsy canon,
Vizquez himself never explicitly makes that connection. Other scholars make similar claims,
but none of their pieces provides significant evidence or normative justification for this
judicial practice. See, e.g., JoRDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 368-70 (1996); Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of
Action, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 421, 426 n.30 (2000); John Cerone, "Dangerous Dicta": The
Disposition of U.S. Courts Toward Recourse to International Standards in Gay Rights
Adjudication, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 543, 552-53 (20o6); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our
International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 118 (20o6); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Democracy, Kulturkampf and the Apartheid of the Closet, So VAND. L. REV. 419, 434 & n.78
(1997); Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties -A Cinderella Story, 102 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 412, 415
(2008); Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive
Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 628, 66o-61 (2007); Christopher
A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L. REv. 67, 86 (2009); Ingrid
Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy
Canon, 46 B.C. L. REv. 293, 350-57 (2005).
27. See, e.g., David Cole, The Idea ofHumanity: Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights, 37 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REv. 627, 645-47 (2006); Alicia Triche Naumik, International Law and
Detention of US Asylum Seekers: Contrasting Matter of DJ- with the United Nations Refugee
Convention, 19 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 661, 672-74 (2007); Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered





Charming Betsy canon, to interpret ambiguous statutes to accord with
customary international law. Some non-self-executing treaties do not codify
customary international law but nonetheless describe U.S. international
obligations. Courts also employ the Charming Betsy canon to select statutory
constructions that do not violate these treaty commitments. Furthermore, at
least one court has interpreted an ambiguous statute to accord with a non-self-
executing treaty, even though there was no domestic law nexus.
Part II analyzes the normative justifications for permitting non-self-
executing treaties' indirect influence through the Charming Betsy canon. When
interpreting a statute that permits multiple constructions, courts should favor
those that accord with ratified treaties." While a treaty may have been ratified
as non-self-executing for a variety of reasons, the act of ratification formally
binds the United States to the treaty's terms and creates international
obligations. A court's selection of statutory interpretations that do not accord
with a ratified treaty may result in judicially created, readily avoidable, and
possibly undesirable breaches of these obligations. Giving non-self-executing
treaties limited, indirect force through statutory construction supports
separation-of-powers principles and encourages relatively costless compliance
with U.S. international commitments. Additionally, by elucidating treaty
provisions and participating in the international judicial dialogue, domestic
judges promote the international adoption of U.S. treaty interpretations: the
more U.S. judges contribute to the growing transnational corpus of law by
interpreting treaty provisions, the more international law will evolve in tandem
with U.S. law.
I. HOW NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES INFLUENCE STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
All non-self-executing treaties, by virtue of their ratification, describe treaty
commitments. Some may also codify customary international law, permitting
separate but similar Charming Betsy analyses. After reviewing the creation and
application of the Charming Betsy canon, this Part examines how it is used to
preserve these international obligations. Section I.B describes how courts may
rely on non-self-executing treaties as evidence of customary international law.
Once a court has established that a treaty provision constitutes customary
international law, it can then employ the Charming Betsy canon to select a
28. Because the Charming Betsy canon is a rebuttable presumption and not a clear statement
rule, later-in-time statutes that clearly contradict treaty obligations will be given full effect.
See infra text accompanying notes 125-144.
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compatible construction. Courts have also determined that those provisions
that are both customary international law and treaty commitments may
support two separate Charming Betsy-based arguments. As demonstrated in
Section I.C, even when the treaty commitment does not constitute customary
international law, courts have reasoned that the Charming Betsy canon is still
applicable. Furthermore, at least one court has employed this second analysis
in a case that did not otherwise involve international law.
A. The Charming Betsy Canon
Both customary international law and treaty law are subject to the later-in-
time rule: a subsequent statute that clearly contradicts an international
obligation will eliminate its domestic effect." The Charming Betsy canon,
however, shields customary international law and treaties from being
unintentionally overwritten by apparently contradictory statutes with multiple
fairly possible interpretations.
In Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the
Court: "[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains . . . ."'0 While Marshall's
language appears to announce a clear statement rule, the holding has proven
most influential in its softer reincarnation as a canon of statutory
construction." This canon takes the form of two rebuttable presumptions:
(i) the "[p]resumption that Congress does not intend to pass statutes which
violate international law"" and (2) the " [p]resumption that Congress does not
intend to pass statutes which violate treaty obligations."" The presumptions
are merged in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States: "Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as
not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the
29. See United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("While the courts
must make a fair effort to interpret domestic law in a way consistent with international
obligations, in the event of irreconcilable conflict, the courts are bound to apply domestic
law if it was passed more recently." (citations omitted)); infra notes 57 & 77.
30. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 139-144 for a review of the evolution of the canon.
32. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 883 (4th ed. 2007) (citing
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982);
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118).




United States."3 4 Neither Marshall's holding nor the modern formulations of
the canon distinguish between self- and non-self-executing treaties.
As currently formulated, the canon has limited application, in that it may
be used only when a statute is ambiguous.3 s A statute is ambiguous if, after
"employing traditional tools of statutory construction,"36 a court "determines
that Congress did not resolve the issue under consideration." 7 Ambiguous
statutes allow for multiple permissible constructions; an "interpretation clearly
contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute"" would not be fairly
possible and would not create ambiguity. Furthermore, the canon is merely
presumptive 9 and therefore may be rebutted by "any potential evidence of
statutory meaning (e.g., statutory text, legislative history, statutory purposes,
policy arguments, and so on)." 40
Courts regularly employ the Charming Betsy canon to reconcile U.S.
international obligations and subsequent, ambiguous statutes. In deciding
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, for example, the
Supreme Court relied on the Treaty Between the United States and Honduras
of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights.4' The question before the
Court was whether the National Labor Relations Board had correctly ordered
representation elections on vessels owned by a corporation organized and
doing business in the United States, given that all of the organization's vessels
flew the flag of a foreign nation, carried a foreign crew represented by a foreign
union, and had other contacts with the foreign nation. Article X of the treaty
provided that "merchant vessels flying the flags and having the papers of either
country 'shall, both within the territorial waters of the other High Contracting
Party and on the high seas, be deemed to be the vessels of the Party whose flag
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 5 114
(1987).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F. 3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The Charming Betsy canon
comes into play only where Congress's intent is ambiguous.").
36. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
37. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1183 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
38. Kankamalage v. I.N.S., 335 F-3 d 858, 862 ( 9 th Cir. 2003) (evaluating when a statute may be
ambiguous for Chevron purposes).
39. However, some courts apply the canon inconsistently. See infra text accompanying notes
170-174.
40. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 884 (emphasis added); see infra text accompanying notes
135-138.
41. 372 U.S. 1o (1963).
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is flown."'"4  This treaty provision proved instrumental to the Court's holding
that the jurisdictional provisions of the National Labor Relations Act did not
extend to foreign flagships employing foreign seamen. Writing for the Court,
Justice Clark noted the importance of deferring to the intentions of the political
branches when the extraterritorial application of a statute would violate a
treaty43:
The presence of such highly charged international circumstances
brings to mind the admonition of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in The
Charming Betsy . . . . [F]or us to sanction the exercise of local
sovereignty . . . in this "delicate field of international relations there
must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed."'
Finding no such expression, the Court held that the Board did not have
jurisdiction to order the election." Justice Clark did not address the treaty's
self-executing status, presumably because it was irrelevant to the application of
the canon.
Until the 198os, courts employed the Charming Betsy canon only in the
context of jurisdictional or maritime disputes. In Weinberger v. Rossi, however,
the Court applied it in an international employment discrimination case to
interpret an ambiguous statute in accordance with an executive agreement. 6 in
so doing, the Court dramatically expanded the canon's scope.4 ' The canon has
42. Id. at 21 n.12 (quoting Treaty Between the United States and Honduras of Friendship,
Commerce, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Hond., art. X, Dec. 7, 1927, 45 Stat. 2618).
43. But see Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F. 3 d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that McCulloch's citation of Charming Betsy stands
only for the presumption against extraterritoriality). For an argument that the Charming
Betsy canon cannot be limited to a presumption against the extraterritorial application of
statutes, see Steinhardt, supra note 24, at 1144.
44. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21-22 (citation omitted) (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo,
S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)).
45. Id. at 22.
46. 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
47. See Steinhardt, supra note 24, at 1154. There is a growing body of scholarship addressing the
question of how the Charming Betsy canon relates to the deference due to agency
interpretations, sometimes in the context of non-self-executing treaties. See, e.g., Mary Jane
Alves, Reflections on the Current State of Play: Have U.S. Courts Finally Decided To Stop Using
International Agreements and Reports of International Trade Panels in Adjudicating International
Trade Cases?, 17 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 299 (2009); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference
and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649, 689 & n.166 (2000); Eric A. Posner & Cass R.




since been applied with international agreements whose subject matter spans a
variety of issues, including immigration, diplomatic relations, and treaties with
Native American tribes.**
The animating concept of the canon is influential even in those cases in
which it is not mentioned by name.40 In Cook v. United States, for example, the
Supreme Court had to determine whether the Tariff Act of 1930 applied to
British vessels allegedly smuggling alcohol into the United States."o The Court
held that the reenactment of an earlier statute that contradicted the intervening
and self-executing treaty did not demonstrate a legislative intent to supersede
the treaty, because a "treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or
modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part of Congress has
been clearly expressed."" Although a court may not explicitly evaluate the self-
executing nature of a treaty, as evidenced by the case studies discussed in the
next Section, domestic courts generally seem to accept the use of the canon in
conjunction with non-self-executing treaties." As evidenced by the case studies
discussed in the next Section, domestic courts generally seem to accept the use
of the canon in conjunction with non-self-executing treaties. It should be
different question from the one addressed in this Note, as it focuses on the current intent of
the executive branch (as represented by the agencies) rather than the past intent of both the
legislature and the executive (as represented by ratified treaties and enacted statutes).
48. See Bradley, supra note 6, at 488-89 & nn.49-52 (citing United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734,
738-39 (1986); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 690 (1979); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968);
Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 147-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); United States v. Palestine
Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
49. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984)
(stating that "a firm and obviously sound canon of construction against finding implicit
repeal of a treaty in ambiguous congressional action" is applicable to a self-executing
treaty); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884) (finding that an immigration
law, written to execute the relevant treaty, did not have an effect on the treaty rights of
resident Chinese aliens to reenter the country).
5o. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
s1. Id. at 120. This formulation echoes the canon disfavoring implied repeals. See infra text
accompanying note 134.
52. See, e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 5o8-10 (1947) (reading the amended Trading with the
Enemy Act as compatible with a treaty granting German aliens inheritance rights); Liberato
v. Royer, 270 U.S. 535 (1926) (concluding that the Workman's Compensation Act was not in
conflict with a treaty with Italy); MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913)
(finding, contrary to the executive's interpretation, that the relevant statute should be
construed without assuming "that Congress proposed to violate the obligations of this
country to other nations"); United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 1o8 U.S. 491,
496 (1883) ("The laws of Congress are always to be construed so as to conform to the
provisions of a treaty, if it be possible to do so without violence to their language.").
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acknowledged, however, that some courts deny the possibility of such an
application entirely,53 while others decline to address the matter."
B. The Role ofNon-Self-Executing Treaties Describing Customary International
Law in Statutory Interpretation
In interpreting ambiguous statutes, domestic courts may refer to non-self-
executing treaties as evidence of internationally binding customary
international law. A country need not ratify a treaty describing customary
international law to be constrained by it, provided that the country has not
persistently objected to the codified norm." Although there is judicial and
academic debate regarding the domestic status of customary international
law," it is generally accepted that because it is subject to the later-in-time rule,
53. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, lo, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that the Charming Betsy canon "does not permit
courts to alter their interpretation of federal statutes based on international-law norms that
have not been incorporated into domestic U.S. law," where "norms" would include
customary international law and treaty commitments expressed in non-self-executing
treaties); Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States, 472 F-3d 1347, 1360 n.21 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(determining that the Charming Betsy canon does not apply to a non-self-executing treaty);
Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 F. 3d 872, 88o (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the Charming Betsy canon cannot be used with "non-self-
executing treaties, which have no force as a matter of domestic law"); cf Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d
at 53 (Williams, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) ("Judge Kavanaugh, I
think, fails to adequately distinguish between treatment of international law norms as
'judicially enforceable limits' on Presidential authority, or as 'domestic U.S. law,' and use of
such norms as a 'basis for courts to alter their interpretation of federal statutes."' (citations
omitted) (quoting Judge Kavanaugh's opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc)).
54. See, e.g., Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F. 3 d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 2005) (declining, in light of
clear congressional intent, to determine whether or how international law and non-self-
executing treaties may be used to construe ambiguous statutes); In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207,
1211 (Fed. Cit. 2005) (recognizing the relevant international agreement as non-self-
executing, noting that the court interprets statutes as being consistent with international
obligations, and ultimately deeming the Charming Betsy canon inapplicable due to
subsequent, explicitly expressed congressional intent).
55. See Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent
Objector in International Law, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 457, 458 (1985). U.S. reservations,
understandings, and declarations to a non-self-executing treaty may be used to demonstrate
that the United States has not accepted a developing customary international law norm,
which may assist a court in determining whether a particular norm exists and whether it is
binding on the United States.
56. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004) (affirming that federal courts




customary international law may be stripped of any domestic force by
subsequent statutes." However, customary international law is partially
shielded from possibly contradictory but ambiguous statutes by the Charming
Betsy canon. Legal interpreters should, where fairly possible, read ambiguous
subsequent statutes so that the two sources of law harmonize: when domestic
law and customary international law apply equally to a situation, "the courts,
regulatory agencies, and the Executive Branch will endeavor to construe them
so as to give effect to both."I"
Determining which norms have obtained the status of customary
international law can be difficult. 9 Because treaties may formally describe
Bihani, 619 F.3d at lo, 16-17 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)
("[I]nternational-law norms are not domestic U.S. law in the absence of action by the
political branches to codify those norms."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § i1 cmt. d, § 115 cmt. e (1987) (stating that
customary international law is federal law and supreme over state law).
For an argument conceding that customary international law is commonly recognized
as "federal common law" and critiquing this conceptualization, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 11o HARv. L. REV. 815, 821 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, A Critique]. But
see Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, i1 HARV. L.
REV. 1824 (1998). For a response to Koh's points, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Commentary, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, ill HARv. L. REV.
2260 (1998). Others have taken a more intermediate approach. See Michael D. Ramsey,
International Law as Non-Preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 555 (2002); Ernest A.
Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365 (2002).
57. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. (c Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (stating that the Court would be "bound
by the law of nations" until Congress passed a contrary enactment); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 1i5(1)(a) (1987) ("An act of
Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law . . . as law of the United States if the
purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the
earlier rule . . . cannot be fairly reconciled."); see also United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086,
1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that judges must enforce unambiguous statutes even if that
causes violations of customary international law).
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 cmt. a
(1987).
59. The Constitution allocates the power " [t]o define and punish ... [o]ffenses against the Law
of Nations" to the legislature, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, and Congress often enacts laws
under this power, see, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 n.19
(1962). However, Congress has not yet explicitly defined what constitutes customary
international law.
The Supreme Court has, in effect, acknowledged the binding nature of customary
international law, but, because the Court examines alleged breaches of customary
international law on a case-by-case basis, it is difficult to generalize a rule specifying when
an international obligation will be recognized as customary international law. See, e.g.,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633, 634 (2006) (plurality opinion) (recognizing the
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customary international law, they are useful in clarifying its content.6o Further,
as customary international law is established through a combination of state
practice and opinio juris, treaty ratification itself may evidence a growing
consensus among states that certain norms have acquired the status of
customary international law.6' Thus, if used as an interpretive lens with the
Charming Betsy canon, treaties describing customary international law may
encourage the selection of a compatible interpretation of a statute over an
incompatible one. In practice, courts employ treaties as evidence of customary
international law regardless of whether the United States has ratified the treaty
and regardless of the treaty's self-executing status.62
One archetypical example of a treaty describing customary international
law is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) .
The United States has signed but not ratified the Vienna Convention;
nonetheless, domestic courts recognize that many of its provisions provide
guidance on how to answer questions regarding the formation and effects of
treaties. In Weinberger v. Rossi, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the
Vienna Convention to define "treaty" as including any international agreement
between sovereigns, supporting his ultimate conclusion that Congress's use of
Geneva Conventions as the law of nations); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738 (holding that "a single
illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities
and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well defined
as to support the creation of a federal remedy"); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (noting that the Court usually "construes ambiguous statutes
to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations" and that
"[t]his rule of construction reflects principles of customary international law"); New Jersey
v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 784 (1998) (noting that a sudden shoreline change has no effect
on the boundary between two states and that this is "the received rule of law of nations on
this point").
6o. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
61. In examining a statute criminalizing prostitution, the Supreme Court of Hawaii noted as
evidence of a "general consensus in the international community" the fact that the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women had been
ratified by 185 countries. State v. Romano, 155 P-3 d 1102, 1114 n.14 (Haw. 2007); see also In re
S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 250-51, 252-53 (finding the low ratification
numbers of one treaty useful in determining that it did not codify customary international
law and describing the large number of signatories to another non-self-executing treaty as
indicative of its status as customary international law).
62. There is an ongoing scholarly debate regarding the legality of the United States being
constrained by nonratified treaties describing customary international law. See supra note s6.
For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to observe that, in practice, courts are using
nonratified treaties codifying customary international law in conjunction with the Charming
Betsy canon when interpreting ambiguous statutes.




the word "treaty" included executive agreements.64 The Vienna Convention is
regularly cited by lower courts as providing useful rules for treaty
interpretation and implementation,"s and the Restatement accepts the Vienna
Convention as "a codification of the customary international law governing
international agreements, and therefore as foreign relations law of the United
States even though the United States has not adhered to the Convention."6 6
Agencies and legal authorities also acknowledge that Vienna Convention
provisions describe the customary international law of treaties and apply them
accordingly. In its 1971 Letter of Submittal to the President, the U.S.
Department of State noted that "the Convention is already generally
recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." 67 The
Department of State currently affirms on its website that the United States
"considers many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties to constitute customary international law on the law of treaties. "
Given that domestic courts recognize nonratified treaties such as the
Vienna Convention as evidence of customary international law, it is
unsurprising that they also find that ratified but non-self-executing treaties
may describe customary international law.6 ' Once a court has determined that
a non-self-executing treaty codifies customary international law, it may use the
treaty, in conjunction with the Charming Betsy canon, when interpreting an
64. 456 U.S. 25, 29 f.5 (1982).
65. See, e.g., Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940-41 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (applying article 53 of the Vienna Convention as a source of guidance specifying
when norms attain jus cogens status); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33, 36
(2d Cir. 1975) (applying article 31 of the Vienna Convention to interpret the Warsaw
Convention).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Pt. 3, intro.
note (1987).
67. Letter of Submittal from William P. Rogers, U.S. Sec'y of State, to President Richard M.
Nixon (Oct. 18, 1971), reprinted in S. EXEC. Doc. L, 1 (1971). This description refers to the
substantive sections and neither to the final provisions relating to the conclusion of the
Vienna Convention nor to the methods for resolving disputes about international
agreements. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES Pt. 3, intro. note (1987).
68. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/1/treaty/faqs/7o139.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 20o).
69. Indeed, it seems probable that domestic judges will be more likely to determine that a treaty
codifies debated customary international law when that treaty has received U.S. ratification
as a stamp of approval. Ratification would also undermine any objections based on the
assumption that the United States had persistently objected to the developing norm. See
supra note 55.
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ambiguous statute.7o In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit noted that, while the U.N. Charter was non-self-executing,
it still serves as evidence of customary international law, and, with the
Charming Betsy canon, the Charter influences the interpretation of the Alien
Tort Statute.7 ' The Filartiga court relied on an earlier Second Circuit opinion,
United States v. Toscanino," which had employed both the U.N. Charter and
the Charter of the Organization of American States -also a non-self-executing
treaty-to confirm the existence of a customary international law norm.
While narrowed by Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, which found that norms must be
sufficiently specific and generally accepted before courts may recognize them as
customary international law, 4 the fundamental Filartiga reasoning remains
unaltered." Furthermore, at least one post-Sosa lower court has noted that
"treaties that are not self-executing may be used as evidence of customary law
and do not undermine the viability of a claim under the [Alien Tort Statute]."7 6
70. See, e.g., Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 197, 201 (D. Mass. 2004) (noting that the non-
self-executing International Convenant on Civil and Politicals Rights (ICCPR) and
Convention Against Torture constitute state practice and opinio juris, evidence of customary
international law that could then influence statutory interpretation); Ali v. Ashcroft,
213 F.R.D. 390, 405 (W.D. Wash. 2003) ("While Petitioners may not directly invoke rights
under non-self-executing treaties, or challenge statutes when Congress has clearly abrogated
international law, they certainly may argue that the Court should adopt the statutory
interpretation that is consistent with international law.... Because Respondents' proposed
interpretation of the statute may result in persecution or deprivation of life in violation of
international law, Petitioners' proposed construction is preferred as it reconciles the statute
with the law of nations." (citing Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F-3 d 1095, 1114 ( 9 th Cir.
2001))), rev'd on other grounds, Ali v. Gonzales, 421 F- 3d 795 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Mojica v.
Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 147, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (responding to an argument based on the
ICCPR and apparently viewing the ICCPR as potential evidence of a customary law
obligation, noting that "where a statute can be construed so as to avoid conflict with
international law, it should be so construed").
7i. 630 F.2d 876, 881-82 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
73. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882 n.9.
74. 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) ("[C]ourts should require any claim based on the present-day law
of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized.").
75. See id. at 731-32 ("The position we take today has been assumed by some federal courts for
24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga . . . . [W]e are persuaded that
federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations
of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized
nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.").




In tandem with the Charming Betsy canon, non-self-executing treaties
describing customary international law influence domestic jurisprudence.
While those treaty provisions that have been recognized as codifying
customary international law will be given appropriate deference in subsequent
decisions, it is difficult to predict whether other provisions will be similarly
recognized. Nonetheless, non-self-executing treaties describing treaty
obligations -even if not customary international law-may also exert a
powerful influence in domestic courts.
C. The Role ofNon-Self-Executing Treaties Describing Treaty Commitments in
Statutory Interpretation
Treaty law, like customary international law, is subject to the later-in-time
rule.77 However, when evaluating apparently contradictory terms in a non-self-
executing treaty and a later-in-time ambiguous statute, domestic courts may
use the Charming Betsy canon to interpret the statute to avoid violating treaty
commitments.
The United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights78 (ICCPR) on June 8, 1992"7 with a declaration that articles 1 through
27 of the ICCPR are not .so The ICCPR includes provisions that
have not obtained the status of customary international law." Regardless of the
customary status of any particular provision, it constitutes a U.S. international
77. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889)
("If the treaty operates by its own force, and relates to a subject within the power of
Congress, it can be deemed in that particular only the equivalent of a legislative act, to be
repealed or modified at the pleasure of Congress. In either case the last expression of the
sovereign will must control."); cf Tim Wu, Treaties' Domains, 93 VA. L. REv. 571, 595-96
(2007) (observing that only one "important appellate case" applied a later-in-time treaty to
overturn a statute).
78. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. ExEc. Doc. E,
95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179.
79. See i UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
170 (2003).
8o. S. REP. No. 102-23, at 23 (1992).
81. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004) ("Whatever may be said for the broad
principle Alvarez advances, in the present, imperfect world, [the ICCPR] expresses an
aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule having the specificity we require."); Kim
Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1114 (9 th Cir. 2001) (describing the ICCPR as evidence
both of customary international law and of international treaty obligations).
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obligation. Domestic courts regularly employ the ICCPR in conjunction with
the Charming Betsy canon to avoid violating these obligations."
In Maria v. McElroy, a federal district court examined the ICCPR to
determine whether the retroactive application of a statute was lawful." Eddy
Maria, a national of the Dominican Republic, pled guilty to an attempted
robbery in the second degree and was sentenced to two to four years of
detention. Although Mr. Maria's crime did not constitute grounds for
deportation at the time of his conviction, the court read subsequent statutes
expanding the definition of "aggravated felon" as encompassing Mr. Maria's
actions and rendering him deportable."4 At the time of Mr. Maria's crime, a
statutory humanitarian provision allowed the Attorney General to grant
waivers of inadmissibility to potential deportees, including aggravated felons,
who could demonstrate that their deportation would result in extreme
hardship to lawfully resident immediate family members.8' Between Mr.
Maria's crime and his conviction, however, Congress passed the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which restricted relief under
the humanitarian provision.8 6 Shortly after Mr. Maria's conviction, Congress
passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA), which revised the humanitarian provision to prohibit
retroactive waivers of inadmissibility for aggravated felons."
Because "[a]n act of Congress should be construed in accordance with
international law where it is possible to do so without distorting the statute,"
the court concluded that the "retroactive deprivation of Mr. Maria's statutory
right to humanitarian relief from deportation would arguably be contrary to
both the [ICCPR] and customary international human rights law."" After
finding the ICCPR to be non-self-executing, the court determined that it was
nonetheless "an international obligation of the United States and constitutes a
82. See Wuerth, supra note 26, at 331 n.172 (discussing the Supreme Court's evaluation of the
ICCPR in Sosa and its relevance with regard to the Charming Betsy canon).
83. 68 F. Supp. 2d 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Restrepo v. McElroy, 369
F.3 d 627 (2d Cir. 2004) (not discussing Charming Betsy arguments based on treaty
commitments or international law).
84. See id. at 219-22.
85. See id. at 212-13.
86. See id. at 214.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 231. The court analyzed U.S. obligations under the ICCPR and customary
international law separately and found that the retroactive application of the statute violated




law of the land."89 The court concluded that "[r]etroactive application . . .
threatens precisely the type of arbitrary family break-up that the ICCPR guards
against."'o Other courts have employed the Charming Betsy canon to interpret
ambiguous statutes to accord with treaty commitments described in the ICCPR
without requiring that those commitments also constitute customary
international law.91
While the ICCPR figures prominently in this jurisprudence, domestic
courts also apply the Charming Betsy canon when evaluating the influence of
other non-self-executing treaties. In Khan v. Holder, for example, Anjam Parvez
Khan's application for asylum in the United States was denied because he had
allegedly engaged in terrorist activity, a reason for dismissal under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)." Khan argued, inter alia, that the
1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees "compel[led]
a narrower definition of 'terrorist activity"' than that provided in the statute.9 '
After noting that the Protocol was non-self-executing and did not carry the
force of law," the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that it still
might influence the interpretation of a statute: "Under Charming Betsy, we
should interpret the INA in such a way as to avoid any conflict with the
Protocol, if possible."' Although the court ultimately concluded that the INA
8g. Id. at 231-32.
go. Id. at 233. The court then conducted an independent analysis based on customary
international law, in which it relied on the ICCPR and other international agreements as
evidence of customary international law norms. Id. at 233-34.
gi. See, e.g., Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F-3 d 1095, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001) (reading the ICCPR as
counseling against construing a statute to authorize the indefinite detention of removable
aliens); cf 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp. 2d
1236, 1251-52 (D.N.M. 2002) (determining that, as the contested statute was unambiguous,
it was not appropriate to apply the Charming Betsy canon in conjunction with the ICCPR to
reconcile any disharmony), affd, 342 F.3d 1170 (ioth Cir. 2003); Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d
43, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that sentencing a juvenile to life without
possibility of parole did not violate the ICCPR, because while a non-self-executing treaty
may affect federal law, it cannot limit state law), rev'd on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2011
(2010). Graham's reasoning-that the ICCPR, as a non-self-executing treaty, cannot affect
state law -is debatable. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 115 cmt. e (1987) ("Even a non-self-executing agreement of the United
States, not effective as law until implemented by legislative or executive action, may
sometimes be held to be federal policy superseding State law or policy.").
92. 584 F-3d 773 ( 9th Cir. 2009).
93. Id. at 782.
94. Id. at 783.
95. Id.
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and the Protocol did not conflict," the court acknowledged in its analysis that
non-self-executing treaties may influence statutory interpretation.97
Other courts are more explicit in observing that non-self-executing treaties,
even when not describing customary international law, may affect domestic
decisions. In Hyundai Electronics Co. v. United States,'8 the U.S. Court of
International Trade evaluated whether the Department of Commerce's
decision not to revoke an antidumping order breached U.S. obligations under
the WTO's Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 1994 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Antidumping Agreement). Although the
Antidumping Agreement is not self-executing, the court reasoned that "the
Antidumping Agreement is properly construed as an international obligation of
the United States."" After observing that "absent express language to the
contrary, a statute should not be interpreted to conflict with international
obligations," 0 the court found that the relevant statute did not violate the
Antidumping Agreement."o' Furthermore, at least one post-Medellin case has
acknowledged that non-self-executing treaties may continue to affect statutory
interpretation."o2
Even in cases with no international law nexus, domestic courts interpret
statutes in light of non-self-executing treaties."0 3 Kane v. Winn focused on a
federal prisoner's allegations that his medical treatment did not meet the
Bureau of Prisons' regulations and constitutional standards and that the
Bureau retaliated against him after he requested adequate medical care."o After
noting that the United States was a party to treaties forbidding cruel treatment
and requiring adequate remedies'o and observing that the ICCPR was non-
self-executing,"o' the court maintained that "[e]ven when a treaty is not self-
96. Id.
97. See also Usinor v. United States, 28 Ct. Int'l Trade 1107, 1120 n.11 (2004) (finding the
Charming Betsy doctrine inapplicable because there was no inconsistency between a U.S.
statute and the non-self-executing World Trade Organization (WATO) Agreement).
98. 23 Ct. Int'l Trade 302, 312-14 (1999).
gg. Id. at 312.
ioo. Id.
101. Id. at 314.
102. See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1226 (D. Minn. 2008).
103. But see Serra v. Lappin, 6oo F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that, because the
Charming Betsy canon is based on comity concerns, it is inappropriate to invoke it "in a case
involving exclusively domestic parties and domestic acts").
104. 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 166 (D. Mass. 2004).
105. Id. at 195-96.




executing, courts must strive not to interpret statutes to conflict with the
international obligations expressed in such a treaty."o 7 Later, the court clarified
that the Charming Betsy canon applies to both treaty commitments and
customary international law: "As discussed above with regard to treaties,
venerable precedent makes clear that 'an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains."'.os Although the court ultimately did not resolve the full extent to
which treaties and customary international law might affect its decision, 0 9 it
concluded that "[rflegardless of whether and to what extent treaties or
customary law can provide an implied cause of action, courts must approach
prisoner cases under domestic law with an appreciation for the United States'
international obligations."no0 The Charming Betsy canon, as applied separately
to treaty and customary international law, ultimately buttressed the court's
holding that the prisoner did not fail to state a claim for relief."'
Professor John F. Coyle has analyzed how the Charming Betsy canon should
be applied to incorporative and nonincorporative statutes."' It is worth noting
briefly, however, that statutes passed to implement non-self-executing treaties
are often interpreted in light of those treaties. For example, after the United
States ratified the non-self-executing Optional Protocol to the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution, and Child Pornography, it passed implementing legislation. In
United States v. Martinez, this statute was interpreted in light of the Convention
to apply extraterritorially because the statute at issue "was passed to enforce a
multilateral treaty designed to protect children from transnational and domestic
child sex prostitution and 'sex tourism.""' 3
Non-self-executing treaties may describe two types of possibly coexisting
international obligations: customary international law and treaty
commitments. Domestic courts employ the Charming Betsy canon to support
readings of ambiguous statutes that accord with these international
obligations, even in purely domestic contexts. This application of the Charming
107. Id. at 196.
io8. Id. at 201 (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).
1og. See id. at 202.
1o. Id. (footnote omitted).
ill. Id. at 220. But see United States v. Corey, 232 F.3 d 1166, 1179 n.9 (9 th Cir. 2000) (reasoning
that the Charming Betsy canon does not apply in suits to which the United States is a party).
112. Coyle, supra note 22.
113. 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 799 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
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Betsy doctrine necessarily raises a number of normative questions, which are
addressed in the following Part.
II. THE CASE FOR EMPLOYING NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES IN
CONCERT WITH THE CHARMING BETSY CANON
With Part I having described how domestic courts employ non-self-
executing treaties in statutory interpretation, this Part turns to the normative
arguments supporting this practice. Section II.A clarifies why a treaty's self-
executing status should be immaterial when the treaty is used as an interpretive
device. The remainder discusses justifications for and critiques of the use of the
Charming Betsy canon in conjunction with non-self-executing treaties. It
concludes that the canon's use in this context is both permissible and
beneficial.
A. The Immaterial Distinction Between Self- and Non-Self-Executing Treaties
in Statutory Interpretation
The relevance of the distinction between self- and non-self-executing
treaties in their interpretive role may hinge on what "non-self-execution"
actually entails."' If non-self-execution merely means that U.S. courts may not
directly enforce a treaty until Congress passes implementing legislation, it is
unclear why non-self-executing treaties could not still be used indirectly to
avoid unintended violations. Alternatively, Medellin could be read as stating
that a non-self-executing treaty is not meant to have any domestic status."'
This understanding would weaken the argument for using non-self-executing
treaties as interpretative aids.
While discussing how the Charming Betsy canon might have been used in
interpreting the September 20ol Authorization for Use of Military Force,
114. See Wuerth, supra note 26, at 353.
115. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (20o8) ("[A] 'non-self-executing' treaty does
not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has
domestic effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by Congress."); see also Al-
Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cit. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc) ("[I]nternational-law principles found in non-self-executing treaties and
customary international law, but not incorporated into statutes or self-executing treaties, are
not part of domestic U.S. law."); cf Bradley, supra note 6, at 174-75 (noting that the Court's
statements in Medellin and a subsequent denial of a stay could be fairly interpreted as





Professor Ingrid Brunk Wuerth notes several reasons why the latter
understanding is less sensible."' First, it would effectively privilege customary
international law and sole executive agreements at the expense of non-self-
executing Article II treaties." This is problematic, given that Article II treaties,
which require formal approval from the Senate and the President, are arguably
more representative than customary international law (which is established
through state practice and opinio juris) and sole executive agreements (which
are created by the President and are only subsequently submitted for
congressional approval). Second, in applying the Charming Betsy canon, courts
only rarely suggest that its application depends on the self-executing nature of
a treaty."' Indeed, as demonstrated above, courts often ignore the self-
executing status of a treaty entirely."' Finally, due to the difficulty of
determining a treaty's status, distinguishing between self-executing and non-
self-executing treaties in statutory construction would muddy the canon for
both courts and Congress.' Imposing this distinction now-after decades of
courts' almost entirely unquestioned application of the canonm' - might
frustrate congressional assumptions that all treaties will serve as interpretive
devices. Additionally, insofar as Congress passes statutes in the context of the
longstanding Charming Betsy canon, the possibility that ambiguous ones may
be interpreted to accord with non-self-executing treaties is built into the statute
itself.' Because Congress may easily render this interpretative method
inapplicable for individual statutes, employing the Charming Betsy canon with
non-self-executing treaties does not privilege the interests of a Senate that
approved a non-self-executing treaty over the interests of a Congress enacting a
later statute.
116. Wuerth ultimately concludes that courts should construe the Authorization to accord with
the ICCPR but acknowledges that the Charming Betsy canon's presumption may be more
easily rebutted when evaluating whether action taken pursuant to international
humanitarian law complies with international human rights law. Wuerth, supra note 26,
at 355-56.
117. See id. at 353-54 & n.261 (citing F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164
(2004), and Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982), as evidence that the Supreme Court
has employed the Charming Betsy canon in conjunction with customary international law
and sole executive agreements, respectively).
18. See id. at 354.
11g. See id. at 354 & n.262 (citing Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, supra note
5, at 716).
120. See id. at 354.
121. See id. at 330.
122. For similar reasoning regarding statutes that allow for retroactive reopening, see Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 234 (1995).
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Putting aside the domestic status of non-self-executing treaties, there
remains an important normative justification for employing the Charming Betsy
canon with a treaty without regard for its self-executing status. The act of
treaty ratification creates U.S. international obligations. By applying the canon
when a statute is ambiguous, courts avoid creating unintended breaches of
those treaty commitments, leaving the final decision on whether to violate
international obligations in the political branches' control. Avoiding
inadvertent, judicially created breaches is critical given that "[vIiolating
international-law norms and breaching international obligations may trigger
serious consequences, such as subjecting the United States to sanctions,
undermining U.S. standing in the world community, or encouraging
retaliation against U.S. personnel abroad."'
Thus, the seeming paradox between courts' claims that applying the
Charming Betsy canon reflects the political branches' intentions and the fact that
courts regularly ignore declarations of non-self-execution when doing so is
resolved: by abandoning the distinction, courts are more likely to avoid
unintended breaches of U.S. international obligations and thereby avoid
intruding on the political branches' sphere.'" Given that the distinction
between self- and non-self-executing treaties should be immaterial in
evaluating the usefulness of the Charming Betsy canon, the remainder of this
Part does not distinguish between them.
B. The Charming Betsy Canon's Limited Application Fosters Relatively Costless
Compliance with International Obligations
The Charming Betsy canon plays a modest role in statutory interpretation.' 5
If a later-in-time statute unquestionably contradicts customary international
law or a treaty provision, the statutory text prevails."' However, if a statute is
123. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F. 3 d 1, i (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial
of rehearing en banc).
124. It is worth noting that the self- and non-self-executing distinction is a judicial creation. See
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). As courts are bound only by precedent in applying the
canon, the judiciary should be able to apply it as it deems appropriate, especially if doing so
better comports with separation-of-powers principles. See Bradley, supra note 6, at 485.
125. See Al-Bihani, 619 F. 3d at 7 (Brown, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
126. See, e.g., Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d ioo6, 1009 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging
that statutes may not always accord with customary international law); Oliva v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 433 F. 3 d 229, 233, 235 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that customary international law
cannot alter the plain language of the statute and that the Charming Betsy canon is irrelevant




ambiguous,'2 7 the canon may prove useful in selecting between multiple fairly
possible interpretations., 8 The canon's presumption will privilege only
reasonable interpretations of the statute."' It does not demand that courts play
word games that warp the statutory text or purpose: "[T]he contents of [a
non-self-executing treaty are] only relevant insofar as [a statute] is ambiguous
and there is a reasonable interpretation of [the statute] that aligns with the
United States' treaty obligations." 30 As a result, the canon "exerts a negative
force on the meaning of statutes, pushing them away from meanings that
would conflict with international law. Courts do not apply Charming Betsy as
an affirmative indicator of statutory meaning."' 3'
The Charming Betsy canon is not unlike the constitutional avoidance canon,
which suggests that courts should "'first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which [a constitutional] question may be
avoided.""" In fact, courts often cite the Charming Betsy case for the
constitutional avoidance canon, demonstrating the two canons' similar
foundational reasoning." The Charming Betsy canon also bears some similarity
to the canon against implied repeal of earlier statutes. 134 All three canons
assume that the legislature does not intend to contradict other sources of law
and allow the judiciary to avoid creating unnecessary conflicts.
The Charming Betsy canon functions best as a presumptive rule. Professor
William Eskridge and his coauthors state that substantive interpretive canons,
such as the Charming Betsy canon, may be treated as tiebreakers, presumptions,
or clear statement rules. Tiebreakers are used when, "at the end of the basic
interpretive process, the court is left unable to choose between the two
127. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
128. See, e.g., Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that
customary international law cannot modify otherwise plain statutory language but that it
can be used in conjunction with the Charming Betsy canon to resolve ambiguous statutes).
129. See supra text accompanying note 38.
130. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1226 (D. Minn. 20o8); see also
Cabrera-Alvarez, 423 F. 3d at loo9-1o (stating that, where it is possible to do so without
distorting the statute, courts should construe statutes so as not to conflict with customary
international law).
131. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc).
132. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
133. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[The constitutional avoidance canon] has its roots in Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Murray v. The Charming Betsy.. . .").
134. See, e.g., United States v. United Cont'l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976).
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competing interpretations put forward by the parties."' Presumptive canons
are those which, "at the beginning of the interpretive process, set up a
presumptive outcome, which can be overcome by persuasive support for the
contrary interpretation.",1 6 Presumptions may typically be overcome by "any
potential evidence of statutory meaning (e.g., statutory text, legislative history,
statutory purposes, policy arguments, and so on)."13 7 Meanwhile, "clear
statement rules" are those that "purport to compel a particular interpretive
outcome unless there is a clear statement to the contrary.""" Whereas
tiebreaker and presumptive canons are interpretive tools that courts use to
select among interpretations, clear statement rules generally mandate the
consistent selection of one interpretation over others.
Chief Justice Marshall's original, inflexible statement in Charming Betsy"'
has evolved into a canon that is usually applied as a rebuttable presumption.
Early Supreme Court decisions employing the statutory Charming Betsy canon
seemed to view it as a clear statement rule, requiring Congress explicitly to
invalidate earlier treaties before the Court endorsed a contradictory
interpretation of the relevant statute. In 1933, the Court stated that "[a] treaty
will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute,
unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed."' More
recent cases, however, imply that the canon is merely a rebuttable
presumption. In 1982, rather than demanding that Congress provide a clear
statement, the Supreme Court required only "some affirmative expression of
congressional intent to abrogate the United States' international
obligations."14'
Similarly, the Restatement's description of the canon has altered over time.
Early text that was more akin to a clear statement rule has since been revised to
reflect the current, less strict presumptive version. The 1965 Restatement
135. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 884. The Charming Betsy canon does not generally appear
to have been used as a tiebreaker.
136. Id.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of
congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible
construction remains." (emphases added)).
140. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (emphasis added); see also McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963) ("'[T]here must be
present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed."' (quoting Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957))).




advised courts to interpret statutes in accordance with international law
whenever such an option existed; 42 the 1987 Restatement merely states that, if
possible, statutes should not be construed to conflict with international laws.'4 3
However, the earlier bent toward a clear statement rule remains in the latter's
commentary: "The courts do not favor a repudiation of an international
obligation by implication and require clear indication that Congress, in
enacting legislation, intended to supersede the earlier agreement or other
international obligation."'44
The Charming Betsy canon is most beneficial as a rebuttable presumption. If
the canon were merely a tiebreaker, it would be employed only when
arguments cut equally in favor of multiple interpretations, greatly reducing its
usefulness in avoiding unintended breaches of international obligations. As the
canon's application is already limited, using it only as a tiebreaker would
effectively eliminate it. However, given the difficulty of passing corrective
legislation when the judiciary requires a "super-strong clear statement rule,"4
a clear statement rule would create separation-of-powers concerns. As a
presumption, the canon is neither too weak nor too strong: it provides valuable
weight to interpretations in accordance with international law, but it can easily
be rebutted by other evidence commonly used in statutory interpretation.
Given that the Charming Betsy canon applies only when there are multiple
fairly possible interpretations of an ambiguous statute, a rebuttable
presumption enables the United States to acknowledge and comply with its
international obligations at essentially no cost. When there is a choice between
violating international law and cheaply complying with it, the judiciary should
err in favor of compliance-not least because doing so is consistent with
separation-of-powers principles.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 3(3)
(1965) ("If a domestic law of the United States may be interpreted either in a manner
consistent with international law or in a manner that is in conflict with international law, a
court in the United States will interpret it in a manner that is consistent with international
law.").
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114
(1987) ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict
with international law or with an international agreement of the United States.").
144. Id. 5 115 cmt. a (emphasis added).
145. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 935-36.
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C. The Charming Betsy Canon's Deference to the Political Branches Respects
Separation-of-Powers Principles
In his article on justifications for the Charming Betsy canon, Professor
Curtis A. Bradley identifies the separation-of-powers conception as the most
persuasive argument for the canon's use in statutory construction.'14 Bradley
argues that, because the usual justifications for canons have eroded, the
Charming Betsy canon "is best thought of today as a device to preserve the
proper separation of powers between the three branches of the federal
government." 14  Under this separation-of-powers conception, the canon
(1) allows judges to interpret law, secure in the knowledge that possible
misrulings will be corrected by subsequent legislation; (2) reduces the number
of times the courts place the United States in violation of international
obligations against the wishes of the political branches; and (3) defers to
congressional decisions on when and how to violate international law, thereby
reducing the instances in which the legislature unintentionally undermines
executive diplomatic efforts.148
To avoid unintended court-created breaches of U.S. international
obligations, Bradley argues that domestic courts should apply the presumption
to favor fairly possible interpretations that reconcile the requirements of both
146. Bradley, supra note 6, at 485. Other justifications include the legislative intent conception
and the internationalist conception. The former "rests on the assumption that Congress
generally does not wish to violate international law because, among other things, such
violations might offend other nations and create foreign relations difficulties for the United
States." Id. at 495. The text of the Talbot decision supports this conception, as the Court
reasoned that "[b]y this construction the act of congress will never violate those principles
which we believe, and which it is our duty to believe, the legislature of the United States will
always hold sacred." Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 44 (i8o); see also Cabrera-
Alvarez v. Gonzalez, 423 F.3d loo6, 1oo9 (9 th Cit. 2005) (noting that the Charming Betsy
canon exists as a "presumption that Congress intends to legislate in a manner consistent
with international law"). Bradley believes that this justification has been undermined by the
fact that, recently, the legislature has seemed uninterested or even hostile to international
law. Bradley, supra note 6, at 517-23.
According to Bradley, the internationalist conception views the canon as a means of
supplementing U.S. law and conforming it to the contours of international law: "Under this
view, courts should use the canon not primarily to implement legislative intent, but rather
to make it harder for Congress to violate international law, and to facilitate U.S.
implementation of international law." Id. at 498. This justification raises separation-of-
powers concerns, as it could conceivably result in pitting the judicial branch against the
political branches when the latter have made a considered decision to breach U.S.
obligations.
147. Bradley, supra note 6, at 484.




the statute and the treaty in question. Given that international law makes no
distinction between self- and non-self-executing treaties and that the political
branches are charged with fulfilling all U.S. international obligations, a
presumption against an interpretation that would lead to a breach of a treaty
commitment should apply equally to all ratified treaties.14' Bradley's version
"takes no view as to whether particular violations of international law are
desirable . . . . It simply rests on the belief that, for formal and functional
reasons, the political branches should determine when and how the United
States violates international law. 15
Bradley acknowledges that his justification does not entirely avoid
separation-of-powers concerns, but he argues that there is a "difference
between evaluating the content of international law and evaluating the proper
U.S. stance toward this law," which is the domain of the political branches."'
Additionally, consistent with the canon's character as a rebuttable
presumption, the canon is designed to "avoid conflicts, not to give
international law independent, affirmative effect" and, therefore, "does not
pose a significant danger of committing the country to international law in a
way not intended by the political branches."' Finally, the canon applies only
when the statutory text is ambiguous, and yet even when the text is unclear,
the judiciary will continue to give "substantial weight to the views of the
political branches, especially the Executive, regarding the content of
international law."' In addition to avoiding unintentional breaches of U.S.
international commitments and respecting the political branches' intentions,
use of the canon will increase the likelihood that domestic and international
law develop in tandem.
D. The Charming Betsy Canon Encourages Domestic Courts' Engagement with
International Agreements and International Adoption ofDomestic Norms
The Charming Betsy canon "does not require that courts use international
law to override domestic law, only that they try to harmonize the two."154 In
149. Bradley does not distinguish between self- and non-self-executing treaties. Id. at 483
("[T]he Charming Betsy canon presumably applies to all international obligations of the
United States, regardless of whether they are viewed as enforceable domestic law.").
150. Id. at 526; see also Steinhardt, supra note 24, at 1132.
151. Bradley, supra note 6, at 531.
152. Id. at 531-32.
153. Id. at 532.
154. Id. at 484.
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anticipation of potential critiques, the preceding discussion assumes a conflict
between a statute and international law. However, the relationship between
domestic and international law was intended and largely has continued to be
one of mutual reinforcement.
Employing the Charming Betsy canon to interpret ambiguous statutes in
accordance with non-self-executing treaties is consistent with constitutional
commands. The Supremacy Clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land. . . ."1" According to Professor Carlos Manuel
Vizquez, the Founders included "all Treaties" in the Supremacy Clause "to
avoid treaty violations because such violations threatened to provoke wars and
otherwise complicate relations with more powerful nations. The Founders also
wanted to establish a reputation for treaty compliance to induce other nations
to conclude beneficial treaties with the new nation.""' Even if these reasons for
respecting international law and judicial treaty enforcement no longer apply,"'
new reasons to do so have developed."' In an increasingly globalized world, it
is imperative that the United States avoid unnecessary conflicts between its
domestic law and its international obligations.
Much of domestic law already accords with international law, in large part
because the United States actively influences the development of treaties. The
United States often plays a pivotal role in drafting international treaties, and
U.S. ratifications of multilateral treaties often are accompanied by declarations
that U.S. obligations under the treaty are already fulfilled by domestic law.
Therefore, aside from the fact that the Charming Betsy canon does not obligate
or encourage courts to override domestic law, its proper application will likely
favor interpretations that harmonize with provisions previously endorsed by
the United States.
Finally, the Charming Betsy canon provides a mechanism by which the
United States can continue to influence the development of international law
by encouraging domestic interpretations of non-self-executing treaties.
Domestic courts are engaged in a "transnational judicial dialogue," which
155. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
156. Vizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 5, at 617-18.
157. See Bradley, supra note 6, at 491-95 (noting that the Charming Betsy canon was more
reasonable at America's founding, given America's status as a weak state and customary
international law's more explicit and discoverable nature).
158. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at the Annual Meeting
of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International




consists of "informal networks of domestic courts worldwide, interacting with
and engaging each other . . .. Transnational judicial dialogue is the engine by
which domestic courts collectively engage in the co-constitutive process of
creating and shaping international legal norms . . . ."' Domestic treaty
interpretation also often influences the development of customary international
law. 6 o As the United States has historically played a vital role in developing
international law and because it is a repeat player, foreign courts regularly
examine U.S. jurisprudence in their decisions, 61 and U.S. interpretations of
treaties and customary international law are often embraced internationally.
The Charming Betsy canon encourages and facilitates thoughtful participation
in the transnational judicial dialogue, thereby allowing domestic courts to
promote U.S. interpretations of international law abroad. 16
E. Critiques of the Canon and Its Application
Judges and international law scholars have raised a number of critiques to
the general application of the Charming Betsy canon that would apply equally -
if not even more strongly -to its use in conjunction with non-self-executing
treaties. These critiques include (i) that the canon privileges international
law-which is allegedly countermajoritarian" and antidemocratic'- at
domestic law's expense; (2) that, in the alternative, the canon is useless, as it
has no effect; (3) that, because of the breadth and variety of international law,
judges apply the canon variably; (4) that the canon does not reflect legislative
159. Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue
in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 490 (2005). Additionally, to the
extent that an international judicial system is emerging, it is in America's best interest for its
courts to take steps to further its development. See Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an
International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REv. 429 (2003).
16o. See, e.g., MuRPHY, supra note 6, at 83-85 (discussing how the U.N. Charter and the 1949
Geneva Conventions have shaped customary international law).
161. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997,
at 183, 186.
162. Nonparticipation carries serious costs: it impoverishes domestic courts' decisionmaking,
weakens international legal discourse, erodes the international influence of U.S.
constitutional law, and reduces the probability that new norms are consistent with U.S.
values. See Waters, supra note 159, at 555-59.
163. See Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources To Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 57, 58-61 (2004) (arguing that employing the Charming Betsy canon in
constitutional interpretation is countermajoritarian).
i64. See John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and International Human Rights Law,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1739 (2009).
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intent;',6 (5) that the canon is inapplicable after Erie; (6) and that the canon
raises federalism issues. This Section addresses each of these concerns in turn.
The legitimacy of using international law in domestic courts is debated
vigorously, raising complex questions beyond the scope of this Note.
Nevertheless, because of its limited application 6 6 and its nature as a rebuttable
presumption,167 the Charming Betsy canon does not overly privilege
international law. The Charming Betsy canon applies only to ambiguous texts
and provides support only for those constructions deemed fairly possible by
traditional interpretive practices. Consider Professors Eskridge and Frickey's
cable-versus-chain metaphor: they argue that legal interpretations are most
persuasive when they are fashioned as a cable of bundled threads, rather than
as a chain.16 The strength of the latter depends on its weakest link, while the
strength of the former is cumulative. When deciding among interpretations,
judges must consider contradictory arguments -threads pulling in different
directions. In these situations, "[tihe cable metaphor suggests that . . . the
result will depend upon the strongest overall combination of threads." 6 , An
argument interpreting text in light of a non-self-executing treaty is but a single
thread among many, not a determinative weight on a scale. When enough
threads pull the other direction, a treaty's influence is accordingly diminished.
Nor is the Charming Betsy canon useless, even if it will not always alter
domestic decisions. In some cases the canon may prove determinative. When
multiple arguments pull toward two different interpretations, the canon may
provide the decisive line of reasoning. Further, even where the canon is
mentioned only as dicta, it provides a useful means whereby judges can
describe U.S. understandings of customary international law and treaty
provisions. By participating in the developing transnational judicial
conversation, judges increase the probability that domestic understandings of
norms will influence international law.
When employing the Charming Betsy canon, the breadth of international
and foreign law is not a weighty concern. Simply put, the use of the Charming
Betsy canon in conjunction with non-self-executing treaties will be limited to
the few germane non-self-executing treaties. The less relevant the treaty, the
16S. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F-3d 1, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the
denial of rehearing en banc); Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F. 3 d 1145, 1153
(7th Cir. 2001).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 125-131.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 139-144.
168. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning,




easier it will be to rebut the presumption with other traditional interpretive
methods.
However, it should be noted that courts are currently applying the canon in
diverse ways, reducing its usefulness as a predictive and precedential tool.
Because the Supreme Court has not provided an explicit description for how
the canon is to be used, lower court practice varies widely. Some courts
reason - problematically170 - that the Charming Betsy canon necessarily requires
a clear statement rule,17' and at least one court has appeared to rely on the
canon to evade apparently plain legislative commands .17 At the opposite end of
the spectrum, some courts use the canon - again, problematically"73 - only as a
tiebreaker. Given the growing number of citations to treaties in domestic
171courts, it would be useful for the Supreme Court to provide guidance on how
to use the canon appropriately in statutory interpretation. Such direction
would standardize the application of the canon, limit judicial discretion, and
avoid erosion of the canon's benefits through inconsistent application.
While the extent to which the canon reflects legislative intent is
debatable,"17 when applied correctly, it is relatively nonintrusive. The canon's
justification sounds in separation-of-powers principles. When fairly possible, it
provides a means for judges to avoid potentially breaching U.S. international
obligations, leaving such vital foreign policy decisions to the political branches.
170. See supra text accompanying note 145.
171. See, e.g., Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 599 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("This rule interacts
with the 'Charming Betsy' principle to create a principle of clear statement: since Congress
may overrule customary international law (Paquete Habana), but laws are to be read in
conformity with international law where possible (Charming Betsy), it follows that in order
to overrule customary international law, Congress must enact domestic legislation which
both postdates the development of a customary international law norm, and which clearly
has the intent of repealing that norm." (citations omitted)), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
172. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
("This court acknowledges the validity of the government's position that Congress has the
power to enact statutes abrogating prior treaties or international obligations entered into by
the United States. . . . However, unless this power is clearly and unequivocally exercised, this
court is under a duty to interpret statutes in a manner consonant with existing treaty
obligations." (second emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
173. See supra text accompanying note 145.
174. A Westlaw search indicates that in the 1960s, few treaties were cited per year, ranging from
two in 1962 to eleven in 1967, 1968, and 1969. Since 1999, over one hundred federal and
state cases each year have cited treaties, reaching a new peak of 159 cases citing treaties in
2010.
175. See Bradley, supra note 6, at 517-23.
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Erie established that there is no general federal common law.176 Insofar as
that decision is understood as having rendered customary international law
and non-self-executing treaty commitments entirely inapplicable in federal
court absent implementing legislation, the rationale for applying the Charming
Betsy canon would be weakened.1' While this is a complicated and ongoing
argument, " for the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to observe that the
Supreme Court and most lower courts have continued to apply the Charming
Betsy canon to avoid breaches of customary international law and other treaty
commitments after Erie, with little discussion of Erie's potential applicability.
Judicial silence on this issue suggests that it is not of grave concern.
Employing the Charming Betsy canon raises potential federalism concerns,
as individual states do not have much influence over whether the federal
government encourages or accedes to the development of a customary
international law norm or ratifies a non-self-executing treaty. While the extent
to which customary international law and non-self-executing treaty
commitments should affect state statutory interpretation is still undetermined,
the above arguments still favor its application. The canon has limited effect, it
may be easily rebutted through traditional methods of statutory interpretation,
and it avoids possibly unintended breaches of international obligations.
All in all, the indirect influence of both self- and non-self-executing treaties
through the use of the Charming Betsy canon provides an appropriate level of
deference to domestic and international law. As such, this practice should be
recognized as an ideological meeting ground for nationalists and
internationalists. The former can champion the canon's structural
subordination of international law to clear, contradictory domestic statutes; the
latter can celebrate this relatively costless method of acknowledging and
developing international law."'
176. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
177. But see Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation: The Use and Misuse of
Charming Betsy, 67 OHIo ST. L.J. 1339, 1352 (20o6) (arguing that the Charming Betsy canon
came into its own in the 1950s).
178. See supra note 56.
179. Given how useful the Charming Betsy canon is in the statutory context, would it be similarly
valuable to develop a constitutional Charming Betsy canon? While a broad constitutional
presumption favoring accordance with international obligations would almost certainly be
impermissible, it does not appear that any scholar has yet considered whether the use of a
narrowed version would be acceptable. While answering this question is beyond the scope





There are legitimate reasons to celebrate and criticize Medellin's reasoning.
The case clarifies murky areas of domestic law, but it does so at the expense of
the United States fulfilling its international commitments. However, those
who rejoice in or bemoan Medellin's seeming presumption in favor of non-self-
execution mistake the case's import. While high-profile decisions like Medellin
will draw fire, treaties' influence in domestic jurisprudence remains largely
unaffected.
Treaties, even self-executing treaties, are rarely used directly. Instead, in
concert with the Charming Betsy canon, both self- and non-self-executing
treaties serve as useful tools in statutory construction. Existing court practice
reflects this understanding, and normative arguments support it. The limited
application of the Charming Betsy canon results in relatively costless compliance
with international law, accords with separation-of-powers principles by
avoiding unintended and possibly undesirable breaches of international
obligations, and allows domestic courts to engage with and influence
developing norms. In giving meaning to U.S. international obligations while
respecting the limits of international law in domestic jurisprudence, judicious
application of the Charming Betsy canon in conjunction with non-self-executing
treaties reconciles often-opposing interests.
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